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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-EDUCATIONAL DEGREE DOES NOT CON-
STITUTE MARITAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO DIVISION BETWEEN
SPOUSES UPON DIVORCE. Graham v. Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo.
1978).
Graham v. Graham' recently presented the Colorado Supreme
Court with the compelling argument that an educational degree ob-
tained during marriage should constitute marital property subject to
division upon divorce. This argument was premised upon the wife's
contribution to her husband's educational degree and his increased
earning capacity.2The Colorado Supreme Court chose to approach this
question within the narrow, definitional boundaries of "marital prop-
erty," rather than to employ an equitable approach that recognized the
practical consequences of excluding an educational degree from the
category of marital property assets. As a result, the court foreclosed any
relief when parties are situated as in the Graham context.
After six years of marrriage, Anne and Dennis Graham jointly
filed a petition to have their marriage dissolved. The wife had been
employed as an airline stewardess throughout the marriage, while her
husband worked part-time and attended school to earn a master's de-
gree in business administration (M.B.A.). During this period the wife
provided approximately seventy percent of their income. The parties
had accumulated no marital property, and the wife sought no mainte-
nance from her husband.
3
The wife contended, however, that her husband's M.B.A. degree
constituted marital property and, as such, was subject to division upon
1. 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978).
2. See notes 3-5 infra and accompanying text.
3. The husband's main pursuit during the marriage was his education. He acquired both a
bachelor of science degree in engineering physics and a master's degree in business administration
during the marriage. Upon graduation, he obtained employment with a large corporation at a
starting salary of $14,000 per year. 574 P.2d at 76.
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dissolution of the marriage.4 This contention was based on her eco-
nomic support of the husband, which had enabled him to attain his
degree and improve his potential earning capacity. Further, marital
property subject to valuation and division must include the husband's
degree if the wife was to be compensated for her "investment" in the
future of their relationship.5
The wife's characterization of the M.B.A. degree as a property as-
set was prompted by the terms of Colorado's Uniform Dissolution of
Marriage Act.6 The Act removes fault considerations from the distribu-
tion of marital property7 and attempts to avoid the problems associated
with continuing support payments by encouraging property division as
the means of satisfying support obligations. To achieve this aim, the
statute denies the award of maintenance unless a spouse lacks sufficient
property to provide for his needs and is unable to support himself
through reasonable employment.8
In Graham the wife had supported the household during the mar-
riage and was clearly capable of supporting herself upon divorce. Be-
cause of her inability to qualify for maintenance,9 her only potential
4. Id.
5. The "investment" nature of the wife's contribution to her husband's education was partic-
ularly emphasized by the dissent: "Her earnings not only provided her husband's support but also
were "invested" in his education in the sense that she assumed the role of breadwinner so that he
would have the time and funds necessary to obtain his education." 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J.,
dissenting).
6. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-10-101 to 133 (1973).
7. The Colorado dissolution of marriage statutes are substantially adopted from parts III
and IV of the Uniform Act, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §§ 301-410. The Commis-
sioners' prefatory note to the Uniform Act emphasized the intent of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to totally eliminate the concept of marital fault in divorce
proceedings. According to the Commissioners, the "Act's elimination of fault notions extends to
its treatment of maintenance and property division." 9 U.L.A. 455,457 (1973). See generally New-
bern & Johnson, The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: Analysisfor Arkansas, 28 ARK. L. REV.
175 (1974); O'Connell, Marriage, Divorce, and the Unform Marriage-andDivorceAct, 17 N.Y.L.F.
983 (1972); Comment, The Unform Marriage and Divorce Act, 37 MONT. L. REV. 119 (1976);
Note, Property, Maintenance, and Child Support Decrees Under the Unform Marriage and Divorce
Act,18 S.D.L. REV. 558, 566 (1973).
The Colorado statute's underlying purpose is to make "legal dissolution of marriage more
effective for dealing with the realities of martrimonial experience by making an irretrievable
breakdown of the marriage relationship the sole basis for its dissolution." CoLo. REv. STAT. § 14-
10-102(2)(c) (1973). The statute further provides that in a proceeding for disposition of the marital
property, the division is to be made "without regard to marital misconduct." CoLo. REV. STAT. §
14-10-113(1) (Supp. 1976).
8. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308. The Commissioner's note following § 308
of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act specifies the intent to rely on property division rather
than maintenance. Maintenance is only to be awarded if the property division is insufficient to
satisfy a spouse's financial needs. Id. The Colorado statute also denies the award of maintenance
unless a spouse lacks sufficient property to provide for his needs, and is unable to support himself
through reasonable employment. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-114(l)(a)-(b) (1973).
9. The Colorado Supreme Court repeatedly noted that the petitioner sought no maintenance
2
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award from the court would come from the property division. Because
there was no other marital property, she attempted to enlarge the
classification of marital property to include her husband's degree.
Expert testimony established that the present value of the hus-
band's M.B.A. degree was $82,836.10 The trial court classified this edu-
cation as an independent asset of marital property and awarded the
wife $33,134.'This finding was based on the similar factual pattern
and holding of Greer v. Greer.12 The wife in Greer was awarded ali-
mony in gross, and on appeal the former husband claimed that her
remarriage had terminated his support obligation. 13 However, the Col-
orado Court of Appeals refused to allow termination of the husband's
payment obligation. The court felt that the award "was not intended
for the support of the wife. Rather it resulted from a consideration of
the wife's contribution to the parties assets and constitutes an adjust-
ment of property rights.'14
The Graham Analysis
The issue of whether an educational degree is an item of property
was one of first impression for the Colorado Supreme Court.t5 The is-
sue required the court to answer two questions regarding the role of an
educational degree: first, whether such a degree should be considered
an independent property asset and be divided between the parties, and
second, whether it should be considered in determining each spouse's
share of the marital property and the level of maintenance payments.16
The supreme court was unwilling to extend the "adjustment of
property rights" argument to include a degree, noting that Greer had
not determined that a medical education itself constituted marital prop-
from her husband. Certainly the court recognized that she was unable to qualify within the statu-
tory requirements. See note 8 supra.
10. 574 P.2d at 76. The expert testimony was based on the husband's increased capacity repre-
sented by the M.B.A. degree.
11. This amount was made payable in monthly installments of $100. For discussion of the
various forms of alimony, see H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 14.5 at 447 (3d ed.
1968) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
12. 32 Colo. App. 196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973).
13. Id. at -, 510 P.2d at 907. See generally CLARK supra note 11 at § 14.9.
14. 32 Colo. App. at -, 510 P.2d at 907 (emphasis added).
15. 574 P.2d 75.
16. An affirmative answer to the first question would have upheld the ruling of the trial court.
A degree would be accorded an independent value, included in the marital property assets and
divided in the dissolution proceedings.
In the alternative, an affirmative answer to only the second question would produce a radi-
cally different result. Unless other marital property had been accumulated or maintenance was
awardable, consideration of the degree as a factor in the division of property would be pointless.
[Vol. 13:646
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erty. '7Further, Greer was considered distinguishable since it involved a
division of marital property and maintenance.' 8
Addressing the first question of whether a degree should be con-
sidered an independent property asset, the Colorado court divided. The
majority chose to rely on the statutory definition of property19 and
prior case law.20 The dissent recognized that the wife's contribution to
her husband required a practical approach, one responsive to the need
to provide her equitable compensation.2' Despite the compelling argu-
ments of the dissenting Justices, the majority's analysis centered on the
limited definitional issue of whether an educational degree could be
included within the traditional notions of "property." 22
The majority held that an educational degree was not within the
statutory definition of property, even though it was admitted that the
legislature intended to create a "broadly inclusive" definition.23 In ar-
riving at this result, the critical factors identified were the absence of an
exchange value for an educational degree, its personal relationship to
the holder and the fact that such a degree is not inheritable.24 Because
an educational degree was not considered property and accorded an
independent monetary value, it was not subject to division upon di-
17. 574 P.2d at 77.
18. Id. The Supreme court's conclusion that Greer was distinguishable from Graham on the
basis of the relief sought is questionable. Whether or not other marital property assets were in-
volved or maintenance sought was immaterial to the definitional issue of property assets. The
basis for the precedential value of Greer is its consideration of the wife's contribution to her hus-
band's medical education as requiring a property rights analysis. 32 Colo. App. 196, 510 P.2d 905
(1973).
19. Section 14-10-113(2) of the Colorado statutes defines marital property:
For purposes of this article only, 'marital property' means all property acquired by
either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage or
in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation; and
(d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(2) (1973).
20. The court recognized the broad discretionary powers of the trial court and absence of a
strict formula for determining the division of marital property. See Carlson v. Carlson, 178 Colo.
283, 497 P.2d 1006 (1972). Further, the supreme court noted the following property definition: "In
short it embraces anything and everything which may belong to a man in the ownership of which
he has a right to be protected by law." 574 P.2d at 76 (quoting from Las Animas County High
School Dist. v. Raye, 144 Colo. 367, 356 P.2d 237, 239 (1960)).
21. Justice Carrigan stated: "The issue here is whether traditional, narrow concepts of what
constitutes "property" render the courts impotent to provide a remedy for an obvious injustice."
574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
22. Id at 76.
23. The majority considered the legislature's use of the adjective "all" in COLO. REV. STAT. §
14-10-113(2) (1973), as evidence of a far reaching property definition. 574 P.2d at 76.
24. 574 P.2d at 77.
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vorce. In answer to the second question, the degree and the increased
earning capacity which it represented were considered afactor in prop-
erty division and award of maintenance.
25
Precedent for this holding was found in decisions from Califor-
nia26and New Jersey.27 These states have considered whether education
or increased earning capacity, or both, could be considered as separate
items of property. Both have held that neither has an independent
value but merely constitute factors to be considered in the division of
property and determination of alimony.
28
The dissent rejected this authority and argued that the most valua-
ble asset of the marriage was the husband's increased earning capac-
ity.29Though unable to cite any decisions that have considered earning
capacity as a separate property asset,30 the dissent claimed that "[i]n
cases such as this, equity demands that courts seek extraordinary reme-
dies to prevent extraordinary injustice."'3' The dissent analogized the
present case to decisions involving a spouse's contribution to the busi-
ness advantage and good will of a professional practice.32 Though con-
sidered intangible and difficult to evaluate, several jurisdictions have
awarded the good will of a professional practice an independent value
and made it subject to division as a marital property asset.33
25. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 78. See notes 15, 16 supra and accompanying text.
26. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App.2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
27. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
28. The California Court of Appeals was faced with the issue of whether an educational de-
gree obtained during the marriage constituted community property. Expert testimony was intro-
duced to establish a property valuation of a law degree and the court rejected this evaluation.
Education is considered an intangible property right and incapable of being assessed a monetary
value. Therefore, no amount was to be considered for division between the parties. Todd v, Todd,
272 Cal. App. 2d 786, -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969).
In Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
regardless of whether earning capacity had been enhanced by the efforts of a spouse, it should
only be considered in determining an equitable property distribution and on the issue of alimony.
Future earning capacity was not deemed a separate item of property within the meaning of the
statute. Id at -, 331 A.2d at 260.
The first District Court of Appeals of Indiana has held that "there is nothing in the statute
which lends itself to the interpretation that future income is 'property' and therefore divisible."
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 365 N.E. 2d 792, 795 (Ct. App. Ind. 1977). See also Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio
Op. 2d 450, 185 N.E.2d 773 (Ct. App. 1961); Vanet v. Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. App. 1976),
where future earning capacity has been considered a factor in the award of alimony.
29. 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
30. Several decisions are cited by the dissent which have held earning capacity to be a factor
in the award of alimony and division of property. See Kraus v. Kraus, 159 Colo. 331, 441 P.2d 240
(1966); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 505, 176 P.2d 363 (1946). Cf. Spears v. Spears, 148 So. 2d
564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910, 919 (N.D. 1975) (Vogel, J.,
dissenting) (where the dissent considers an educational degree as a property asset.)
31. 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
32. Id.
33. Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956); In re Marriage of Goger, 27
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For this analogy to be valid, good will and an educational degree
must share similar characteristics.34 The dissent's good will analogy
meets nearly all the majority's objections in their analysis of an educa-
tional degree as property.35 An educational degree is neither alienable
nor inheritable, and it is personal to the holder. Likewise, good will of a
professional practice is personal and non-inheritable. Good will pos-
sesses a present exchange value, and an educational degree, particu-
larly a professional degree, can be assessed a present exchange value
3 6
in terms of earning potential. 37 The critical break down in the good will
analogy is the inability to transfer an educational degree.
Though the analogy is not complete, the dissent could have argued
that the absence of alienability is not sufficient to justify the inequitable
result in Graham. Had the parties remained married for a period after
the husband's graduation, substantial marital property would have
been accumulated. Initiation of divorce proceedings after the accumu-
lation of marital property would have enabled the wife's contribution
to receive consideration in the property division.38 The classic situation
in Graham, where no marital property has been accumulated and
maintenance is not available, rewards the husband who petitions for
divorce immediately after graduation.
Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279
(1976). But see Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972).
34. "Goodwill" was defined by Justice Story to be:
[Tihe advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establishment beyond the mere value
of the capital, stock, funds or property employed therein, in consequence of the general
public patronage and encouragement which it receives from constant or habitual cus-
tomers, on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or
affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances, or necessities, or even
from ancient partialities or prejudices.
J. STORY, STORY ON PARTNERSHIPS § 99 at 170 (1868). See In reMarriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App.
3d 577, 581-82, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52 (1974); Lurvey, Professinal Goodwill on Marital Dissolution: Is
It Properry or Another Name for Alimony 52 CAL. S.B.J. 27 (1977).
35. The majority analysis focused on the factors of: (1) alienability, (2) the personal nature of
the item to the holder, and (3) inheritability. 574 P.2d at 77.
36. See Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956); In re Marriage of
Goger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558
P.2d 279 (1976). But see Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972).
37. "[Fjederal and state records, surveys and statistics dealing with incomes and earnings of
people with various educational backgrounds and of various occupations and professions," were
not allowed into evidence in Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134
(1969). However such data was utilized by the trial court in Graham to establish the present value
of the husband's increased earning capacity. See note 10 supra.
38. The dissent explained that in a divorce with the accumulation of marital property, "abun-
dant precedent authorized the trial court, in determining how much of the marital property to
allocate to the wife, to take into account her husband's earning capacity." 574 P.2d at 78 (Carri-
gan, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, cases involving a spouse's contribution to education
and future earning capacity will typically involve young couples with-
out substantial assets or accumulated marital property.39 Such couples
have concentrated their resources on the attainment of the degree
which the Colorado Supreme Court has determined does not have an
independent value.4° A rule of law rewarding divorce immediately
upon graduation may have been created unthinkingly by the court.
The A vailability of Alternative Relief
The Court maintained that a spouse who contributes to the higher
education and increased earning capacity of her husband is not without
a remedy.4' It is true that where marital property has been accumu-
lated, the contribution to the education of the spouse may be taken into
consideration in the property division. Each spouse's contribution to
marital property has traditionally been a factor in property division.42
On the other hand, where no marital property has been acquired,43 as
in Graham, no basis exists upon which to adjust the equities of the
wife's contribution to her husband's degree.
The court further explained that the determination of maintenance
payments was to be based on all relevant factors, and the educational
support provided in Graham was clearly such a relevant factor. This
basis for consideration of a spouse's contribution is even more illusory
than in the property division context. The policy of the Uniform Act is
to achieve financial independence through property division, and qual-
ification for maintenance is extremely difficult.4 Although the Colo-
rado Supreme Court considered a legal remedy available, the
petitioning wife in Graham was caught in a perfect "catch-22." She in-
vested her present earnings in the attainment of the husband's ad-
vanced educational degree which improved his future earning capacity,
and by proving her ability to provide for the couple's needs, she has
39. Justice Carrigan considered Graham as representative of the "not un-familiar pattern of
the wife who, willing to sacrifice for a more secure family financial future, works to educate her
husband, only to be awarded a divorce decree shortly after he is awarded his degree." Id
40. See notes 17-25 supra and accompanying text.
41. 574 P.2d at 78.
42. See Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973); Mallett v. Mallett, 540 P.2d
1109 (Colo. App. 1975); Rieger v.Christensen, 529 P.2d 1362 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Carlson v.
Carlson, 178 Colo. 283, 497 P.2d 1006 (1972); Thompson v. Thompson, 489 P.2d 1062 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1971).
43. In the case where little marital property has been accumulated, even a total distribution to
the contributing spouse may be insufficient compensation.
44. 574 P.2d at 78. See also Kraus v. Kraus, 159 Colo. 331, 411 P.2d 240 (1966); Shapiro v.
Shapiro, 115 Colo. 505, 176 P.2d 363 (1946); In reMarriage of Eis, 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. Ct. App.
1975).
45. See notes 7, 8 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13:646
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negated the possibility that she might be repaid for her efforts. Without
accumulated marital property, her support during the marriage is with-
out a basis for consideration and her contribution is an uncompensated
loss.
The Oklahoma Alternative
In contrast to the Colorado Supreme Court's definitional approach
to the issue of whether an educational degree constitutes marital prop-
erty,46 the Oklahoma courts have devised an equitable remedy for the
situation presented in Graham. Oklahoma statutes47 concerning the
disposition of property and award of alimony upon divorce allow the
courts considerable discretion in achieving a just and reasonable settle-
ment.48 In contrast, the Colorado statute is more explicit in defining
what factors should be considered in property distribution.49 Regard-
less of these statutory differences, the practical result of property divi-
sion in both jurisdictions is generally the same. Trial courts are given
broad discretion in determining property divisions, and the Oklahoma
Courts generally apply the same factors set fourth in the Colorado stat-
ute.5 The statutes and resulting impact are radically different in their
requirements for alimony payments. The Oklahoma divorce and ali-
mony law does not require the wife to qualify within the restrictive
Colorado guidelines for maintenance.-" The Oklahoma courts are sim-
46. See notes 19-24 supra and accompanying text.
47. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1278, 1289 (Supp. 1977).
48. Section 1278 provides in part:
Alimony may be allowed from real or personal property, or both, or in the form of
money judgment, payable either in gross or in installments, as the court may deem just
and equitable. As to such property, whether real or personal, which has been acquired by
the parties jointly during their marriage, whether the title thereto be in either or both of
said parties, the court shall make such division between the parties as may appear just
and reasonable ....
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1977).
49. The statute provides that property shall be divided without regard to marital misconduct,
and in such proportions as the court deems fair after considering all relevant factors including:
(a) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property,
including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker,
(b) The value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(c) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of prop-
erty is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the
right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children;
and
(d) Any increase or decreases in the value of the separate property of the spouse
during the marriage or the depletion of the separate property for marital purposes.
COLO. Rav. STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (1973).
50. Compare Harrod v. Harrod, 34 Colo. App. 172, 526 P.2d 666 (1974) with Peters v. Peters,
539 P.2d 26 (Okla. 1975).
51. Compare CoLo. REv. STAT. § 14-10-114 (1973) with OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1278, 1289
(Supp. 1977).
8
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ply directed to award alimony "payable either in gross or in install-
ments, as the court may deem just and equitable, '5 2 without the
stringent need and unemployability requirements. As a result of this
broad standard, Oklahoma decisions have frequently obscurred the
distinction between alimony and property division. 3
Section 1289(b) of the Oklahoma statute calls for the courts to dis-
tinguish between alimony and property division. The subsection pro-
vides that the court must designate each portion of any periodic
payments as either payments for support or as a division of property. 4
This distinction permits property division payments to continue beyond
the death or remarriage of the recipient."
The statutory distinctions between payments for support and pay-
ments effecting a property division are critically relevant in the context
of Graham. On several occasions the Oklahoma courts have faced a
fact situation to Graham.6 For example, in Diment v. Diment57 a wife
had supported her husband through undergraduate college and medi-
cal school. The couple had accumulated no marital property, and the
wife was clearly capable of supporting herself. In consideration of the
wife's contribution to her husband's support and education, the trial
court ordered the husband to pay $39,600 as "permanent alimony."5"
On appeal the husband argued that, since the award was not designated
as a property division or alimony for support, it should be considered a
support obligation and be terminated due to the wife's remarriage.5 9
The court of appeals ruled that "although the award [was] termed
52. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1977). See note 48 supra for the relevant text of the
statute.
53. See, e.g., Bowring v. Bowring, 196 Okla. 520, 166 P.2d 415 (1946). See generally Com-
ment, Domestic Relations: Relevant Factors in the Division of Jointly Acquired Propery, 23 OKLA.
L. REV. 288 (1970); Comment, Alimony and the Division of Jointly Acquired Properly, 14 OKLA. L.
REv. 422 (1961). For discussion of the traditional distinctions between alimony and property set-
tlements, see CLARK supra note 11, at § 14.8.
54. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289(b) (Supp. 1977).
55. Section 1289(b) provides that payments made in division of property are nonterminable.
Payments for support shall continue until completed as per the decree or terminate upon death of
the recipient. The court is also directed to terminate the support payments upon remarriage of the
recipient unless a proper showing is made that the support is still necessary. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §
1289(b) (Supp. 1977).
56. See Colvert v. Colvert, 568 P.2d 623 (Okla. 1977); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071
(Okla. Ct. App. 1974); Conrad v. Conrad, 471 P.2d 892 (Okla. 1969); Henley v. Henley, 428 P.2d
258 (Okla. 1967).
57. 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
58. Id at 1072.
59. Id Since Diment, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has ruled that "under § 1289(b) periodic
alimony payments will not terminate upon remarriage of the recipient unless the original decree
designates such payments as being for support, or expressly provides such payments are to termi-
nate upon remarriage of the recipient." Shea v. Shea, 537 P.2d 417, 419 (Okla. 1975).
[Vol. 13:646
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'permanent alimony' it [was] in substance a property award"6 for the
contribution the wife had made to her husband's increased earning ca-
pacity. Although not directly confronted with the issue of whether an
educational degree is a marital asset, the Diment opinion did consider
the value of increased earning capacity as an independent asset for
property division. This result is apparently opposite to the Graham
court's conclusion that an educational degree could not constitute an
independent property asset.6 '
The logical extension of the Diment opinion was later restricted by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Colvert v. Colvert.6z On the basis of
facts nearly identical to Diment, the trial court had awarded the wife
$35,000 in "alimony as a property division. 63 On appeal, the husband
who had received his medical degree six months after petitioning for
divorce, contended that the trial court decree had given the wife a
property right in his license to practice medicine. If such a property
right existed, the husband claimed a similar right in her license to prac-
tice pharmacy. 6' Without substantial clarification, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court rejected the property rights argument and simply stated
that the decree of the trial court "gave no property rights in the yet to
be received certificate to practice medicine. 65
In upholding the decree, the supreme court did not consider the
dual analysis of whether earning capacity or an educational degree
should be considered an independent asset subject to property division,
or a factor in the determination of alimony.66 Property rights were not
involved and yet the $35,000 award constituted a non-terminable prop-
erty division.6
7
The equitable considerations voiced in the opinion of the court
provide some clarification for its holding. The Justices paid particular
attention to the husband's increased earning capacity which had been
60. 531 P.2d at 1073.
61. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
62. 568 P.2d 623 (Okla. 1977).
63. In Colvert, the wife provided support for the family while her husband attended medical
school. The husband's father had paid for most of the medical school tuition and other educa-
tional expenses. Id. at 624.
64. Id. at 625.
65. Id
66. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
67. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held: "The decree gave the wife alimony designated as
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acquired through the efforts of his wife.68 The family was considered as
having made an "investment, not in real or personal property, but in
[the] husband's professional education as a doctor. ' 69 The court was
simply unwilling to deny the wife compensation for her contributions
to the family.
In refusing to classify this award as a "property right" in the medi-
cal degree, the court would have seemingly agreed with the majority in
Graham. Nevertheless, Colvert must have granted the degree some in-
dependent value since the small amount of other marital property sub-
ject to division was exceeded in value by the wife's award in the divorce
decree. The Oklahoma courts have ruled, through Colvert and Diment,
not only that increased earning capacity or an educational degree is to
be considered in determining each spouse's share of the marital prop-
erty, but that they may be considered to increase the basis for that
share.
Thus the Oklahoma Supreme Court has utilized the flexibility in
the Oklahoma statutes to fashion an equitable remedy. However, the
cost of this position is a further blurring of the traditional lines between
alimony for support and payments to effect a property settlement.70
Conclusion
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act has provided concise
guidelines for determining property division and maintenance in disso-
lution proceedings.7' The application of the Colorado version of the
Act under the circumstances in Graham illustrates the potential for un-
just results when the statute is strictly applied. Classifying a spouse's
contribution to the educational status of her partner as a factor in de-
termining the financial settlement is in accordance with other jurisdic-
tions, 72 but the Colorado emphasis on property division and restrictive
qualifications for maintenance results in inequity. In the absence of ac-
cumulated marital property, a spouse's contribution is without a basis
for consideration and merely an illusory factor.
While not adhering to the traditional concepts and purposes of ali-
mony and property division, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has fash-
ioned an equitable remedy for the injustice presented in Graham. This
68. Id at 626. The equitable arguments of the Graham dissent are reflected in the reasoning
of the Oklahoma Justices.
69. Id
70. See note 53 supra.
71. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT §§ 301-410. Seenote 7 su ra and accompanying
text.
72. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
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approach, while obscuring the conceptual framework of property divi-
sion and support alimony, coincides with the perceptions of the dissent-
ing justices in Graham.
The Colorado statute is a successful attempt to define the financial
considerations in marriage dissolution, but diverse situations require
responsive judicial treatment and equitable solutions. Consistent fail-
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